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Two kinds of theories of boundedly rational behavior are possible. Static
theories focus on stationary behavior and do not include any explicit mech-
anism for temporal change. Dynamic theories, on the other hand, explicitly
model the ﬁne-grain adjustments made by the subjects in response to their
recent experiences. The main contribution of this paper is to argue that the
restrictions usually imposed on the distribution of choices in the static ap-
proach are generically not supported by a dynamic adjustment mechanism.
The genericity here is understood both in the measure theoretic and in the
topological sense.1I N T R O D U C T I O N
There is a growing empirical evidence that calls into question the util-
ity maximization paradigm. For a description of systematic errors made
by experimental subjects, see Arkes and Hammond (1986), Hogarth (1980),
Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982), Nisbett and Ross (1980), and the
survey papers by Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1992) and by Pitz and
Sachs (1984). On the basis of this and similar evidence, Conlisk (1996) con-
vincingly argued for the incorporation of bounded rationality in economic
models.
Some early attempts to incorporate boundedly rational decision making
in economics were made by Alchian (1950), Simon (1957), and Nelson and
Winter (1982) among others. But a universal model of boundedly rational
behavior still does not exist. The existing models can be divided into two
classes: static and dynamic.
In static models individuals choose the better alternatives more frequently
than the inferior ones. They were introduced in economics by Luce (1959).
It is typical in this type of models to impose some intuitive restrictions on
the choice probabilities and study the probability distributions that satisfy
these restrictions. Such probabilistic choice models have already found their
1application in economics. See, for example, McKelvey, Palfrey (1995, 1998),
Chen, Friedman, Thisse (1997), Anderson, Goeree, and Halt (1998), Oﬀer-
man, Schram, Sonnemans (1998), and Anderson, Goeree, and Halt (2001).
In dynamic models individuals are assumed to adjust their choices over
time in the directions that appear beneﬁcial. The dynamic approach origi-
nated in the work of Bush and Mosteller (1955), was introduced in economics
by Arrow and Hurwicz (1960), and is represented, for example, by papers of
Foster and Young (1990), Fudenberg and Harris (1992), Kandori, Mailath,
Rob (1993), Young (1993), Friedman and Yellin (1997), Anderson, Goeree,
and Holt (1999), and Friedman (2000).
T h ed i s t i n c t i v ef e a t u r eo ft h i st y p eo fm o d e l si sa na t t e m p tt oc a p t u r e
the ﬁne-grain adjustments made by the individuals on the basis of their
current experiences. On a very general level, such adjustments produce a
stochastic process on the choice set. The probability distribution of choices
of a static model can be naturally viewed as the steady state distribution of
the stochastic process arising from a dynamic model. For a study of a broad
class of dynamic adjustment processes, see Basov (2001).
This paper studies the connections between the properties of the static
and the dynamic models. Many dynamic models assume that the process of
2choice adjustment leads to better choices on average. For the purposes of
this paper, I will formalize this idea using the notion of a locally improving
adjustment process.
Let us call an adjustment process locally improving (LI) if the vector
of the expected adjustment points into a direction of the increase of the
utility. In particular, I will consider a broad class of locally improving Markov
processes, I call them PDS processes, for which the deterministic part of the
generator is linked to the gradient of the utility by a constant symmetric
positively deﬁnite linear transformation. A restrictive assumption here is
that the coeﬃcients of the linear transformation a constant, i. e. they do not
vary over the choice space. This assumption is, however, not too restrictive
provided the choice space is suﬃciently small. Since the results of the paper
do not depend on the size of the choice space, this assumption does not drive
the results.
A question I will address is: Can the restrictions usually imposed on the
probability distribution of choices by the static approach be supported by a
generic locally improving adjustment process of this kind? In other words,
does the steady state density of a generic locally improving process satisfy
the usual axioms of the static approach? To address this question let us
3start by introducing two important concepts: payoﬀ monotonicity (PM) and
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA).
An adjustment process is PM if for any admissible choice set the density
of the steady state distribution at x1 is greater than the density of the steady
state distribution at x2 if and only if x1 is preferred to x2. An adjustment
process satisﬁes IIA if the ratio of the steady state probability densities at
any two feasible points do not depend on what other choices are available.
As we will see below, under some mild regularity assumptions the steady
state of each dynamic adjustment process is unique. This, together with the
requirement that the restrictions on the steady state density should hold for
any admissible choice set, implies that the payoﬀ monotonicity and the IIA
characterize the process rather then a particular distribution.
The ﬁrst main ﬁnding of the paper is the following:
(T1) any PM process is LI.
This result is rather intuitive. It claims that for the long-run choice
probabilities to be increasing in the payoﬀs for any choice set the expected
adjustment vector should point into a direction of the increase of the utility
function. The second main ﬁnding of the paper is less intuitive. It states
that:
4(T2) a generic PDS process,(i.e. a process for which the deterministic
part of the generator is linked to the gradient of the utility by a symmetric
positively deﬁnite linear transformation), is neither PM nor IIA. Moreover,
a generic PDS process that satisﬁes IIA is not PM.
The lack of the payoﬀ monotonicity means that given a generic adjust-
ment process one can ﬁnd a choice set, a pair of choices in it, and a pair of
equimeasurable neighborhoods of these choice, such that choices in a neigh-
borhood of the one with a higher payoﬀ are chosen less often in the steady
state. The violation of IIA means that given a generic adjustment process
one can ﬁnd a pair of choice sets and a pair of choices that belong to the inter-
section of these choice sets such that the ratio of the steady state probability
densities of the choices depends on the choice set.
Genericity in the above statement can be interpreted both in the measure
theoretic and the topological sense. Genericity in the measure theoretic sense
means that a property in question does not hold only on a set of dynamic
adjustment processes of measure zero. Genericity in the topological sense
means that the property in question is violated for a nowhere dense set
of dynamic adjustment processes. Note, that the measure theoretic and
the topological genericity are not implied by each other. For a discussion
5see, for example, Oxtoby (1980). In fact, the statement I prove is even
stronger. I prove that the set of the PM (IIA) processes can be embedded as
a submanifold of a lower dimension into an appropriate subset of LI processes.
The same comments about the meaning of genericity as above apply to the
second part of the claim. I also show that any PM process is LI, while there
is no connection between the LI property and the IIA.
These ﬁndings suggest that the usual restrictions on the probability den-
sity in the static approach are too strong. They are not supported by a
generic dynamic adjustment process. If interpreted from an evolutionary
perspective they imply that the adjustment rule the human beings evolved
to use with probability one is neither PM nor IIA. Moreover, it is not close to
any PM or IIA adjustment rule. Therefore, an explicit modelling of the dy-
namic adjustment process is important when describing boundedly rational
behavior.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a broad class of
stochastic adjustment processes. In Section 3 I deﬁne the main concepts of
the paper. Section 4 contains the main results. It states the connections
between the concepts deﬁned in Section 3. Section 5 contains the proofs.
Section 6 concludes.
62 A MODEL OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR
Let us assume that an individual repeatedly faces with a problem of
choosing an alternative from an open, bounded set Ω ⊂ Rn with a smooth
boundary. I will refer to such sets as admissible. She adjusts her choices
gradually in response to her recent experiences. The adjustment rule pro-
duces a stochastic process on the choice set. The expected adjustment vector
can be interpreted as an attempt to increase the individual’s utility, while
the diﬀerence between actual and expected adjustment be interpreted as ex-
perimentation. I will assume that the stochastic process is Markov and that
it possesses a generator. The ﬁrst assumption is essentially a ﬁnite memory
assumption, while the last one is purely technical in nature and is made to
allow us to employ the continuous time technique.
To build a formal model of adjustment, assume that Σ is a sigma-algebra
on Ω,a n df o ra n yΓ ∈ Σ,d e ﬁne P(x(t),Γ,τ) to be the transition probability,
that is the probability that the individual who at time t made a choice x(t),
will make a choice w ∈ Γ at time t + τ.N o t et h a tP does not depend on t
explicitly, since the process is assumed to be Markov.






where I is the identity operator.
Operator $ is known as the generator of the Markov process (Rogers and
Williams, 1994). It can be shown that












Va r(x(t + τ) − x(t)) (4)
(see, for example, Kanan, 1979). Vector µ captures the deterministic trend
in the adjustment rule, while matrix Γ is the covariance matrix of the exper-
imentation errors. The Markov process is completely characterized by vector
µ and matrix Γ. I sometimes refer to it as process (µ,Γ).
Assume that Σ is Borel sigma algebra. The deﬁnition of Γ implies that it
8is positively semi-deﬁnite. I will assume that it is positively deﬁnite. From
an economic perspective, it means that the experimentation has a full range.
Then, if the initial distribution of choices can be characterized by a density
function it can also be characterized by a density function at any t>0 and




















− µi(x)f)ni(x)=0on ∂Ω, (6)
where n(x) is the unit vector normal to the boundary of the choice set ∂Ω
(Ito, 1992). In the rest of the paper I will assume that matrix Γ does not
depend on x. The assumption is made for the sake of simplicity only and
does not seriously aﬀect the results. The preferences of the individual are
given by a twice continuously diﬀerentiable utility function U(·).
93 DEFINITION OF SOME CLASSES OF
ADJUSTMENT PROCESSES
In this Section I am going to deﬁne the main classes of Markov adjustment
processes studied in the paper. Let us start with deﬁning the concept of a
locally improving process.
Deﬁnition 1 A Markov adjustment process is called locally improving (LI)
if
hµ(x),∇U(x)i ≥ 0 for ∀x ∈ Ω.( 7 )
Here and throughout the paper h·,·i denotes the inner product of two
vectors. In words, a process is LI if the vector of the expected adjustment
of the choice, µ, points into a direction of an increase of the utility. The
space of all LI processes is a functional space of an inﬁnite dimension. Next,
Id e ﬁne two ﬁnite-dimensional subsets of LI.
Deﬁnition 2 Markov adjustment process (µ,Γ) is called PD (PDS) if
µ(x)=B∇U,
10where B is a (symmetric) positively deﬁnite matrix with constant coeﬃcients.
Note that PDS⊂ PD⊂ LI and sets PDS and PD are ﬁnite dimensional.
The dimension of PDS is n(n+1), while that of PD is n2+n(n+1)/2. Hence,
both of them can be embedded into space Rk with an appropriate k endowed
with the Lebesque measure and be considered as measure spaces.
The concept of a locally improving process is a dynamic concept. Next I
a mg o i n gt od e ﬁne two concepts: payoﬀ monotonicity and independence of
irrelevant alternatives. One can naturally think of them as static concepts,
since they put restrictions on the steady state density function. However,
demanding that these restrictions should hold for any choices space, they
can be made the properties of the process. To ensure the soundness of this
procedure we need a result from the theory of the stochastic processes. To
formulate the result let us assume that fs,Ω(x) is the stationary solution of




w h e nt h ec h o i c es e ti sΩ. It is also known as the steady state density of the
Markov process.
11Lemma 1 Assume matrix Γ is positively deﬁnite. There exists a unique twice
continuously diﬀerentiable stationary normalized solution of system (5)-(6).
Moreover, it is positive everywhere on Ω and asymptotically stable.
For a proof, see Ito (1992). The result states that the steady state density
is well deﬁned and is determined by the process rather than by the initial
conditions. This allows us to give the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3 A Markov adjustment process is called payoﬀ monotone (PM)
if for any choice set Ω ⊂ Rn and any x1,x 2 ∈ Ω
(fs,Ω(x1) ≥ fs,Ω(x2)) ⇔ (U(x1) ≥ U(x2)). (8)
In words, a Markov adjustment process is PM if for any suﬃciently small
ε>0 the steady state probability that the choice is in the ε− ball centered
at the point x1 is higher then the probability that it is in the ε− ball centered
at point x2 if and only if alternative x1 is preferred to alternative x2.N o t e ,
that the payoﬀ monotonicity refers to the process rather than to a particular
steady state distribution because the latter depends on Ω,w h i l et h ep a y o ﬀ
monotonicity requires (8) to hold for any Ω.
Another important restriction often imposed in the static approach is IIA.
12Deﬁnition 4 A Markov adjustment process satisﬁes independence of ir-
relevant alternatives (IIA) if for any two choice sets Ω1 and Ω2 and any
x ∈ Ω1 ∩ Ω2
fs,Ω1(x)=fs,Ω2(x). (9)
Again, Lemma 1 allows us to talk about IIA processes rather then the distri-
butions satisfying IIA. In words, IIA states that the ratio of the steady state
probability densities of two choices does not depend on what other choices
are available. My next task is to investigate the connections between the
PM, the IIA, and the LI (PD, PDS).
4T H E M A I N R E S U L T S
In this Section I study the connections between the LI, the PM and the
IIA and formulate the main results of the paper. I formulate two Theorems.
Theorem 1 states that any PM process is LI. Formally, the following result
is true.
Theorem 1 Assume that
1.
∀x ∈ Ω (µ(x)=0 )⇔ (∇U(x)=0 )
132. Set of UC of the critical points of the utility deﬁned by
UC = {x ∈ Ω : ∇U(x)=0 }
is ﬁnite. Then PM ⊂ LI.
The ﬁrst assumption states that there is no deterministic adjustment at
the critical points of the utility. The second is a regularity assumption. It
will always hold if the utility function is analytical. Theorem 1 states that LI
is necessary for the process to be PM. It is, however, not suﬃcient. Moreover,
a typical LI process is not PM. To formalize this idea I will restrict attention
to the ﬁnite-dimensional subclasses of LI, PD and PDS. Theorem 2 states
that a typical PD (PDS) process is neither PM nor IIA. Moreover, a typical
process that is both PDS and IIA is not PM.
Theorem 2 Let assumptions of Theorem 1 hold and also assume that the
Hessian of the utility has full rank. Then for any n>1
1. PD ∩ PM can be embedded in PD a sas u b m a n i f o l do fal o w e rd i m e n -
sion
2. PDS ∩ PM can be embedded in PDS as a submanifold of a lower
dimension
143. PM ⊂ IIA
4. PDS ∩ PM can be embedded in PDS ∩ IIA as a submanifold of a lower
dimension










then PDS ∩ IIA can be embedded in PDS as a submanifold of a lower di-
mension.
The assumption in part 5 of the Theorem states that the utility is not
additively separable and does not become additively separable after a non-
degenerate linear transformation.
T h em a i nm e s s a g eo ft h e s eT h e o r e m si st h a tt h ea s s u m p t i o n so ft h ep r o b -
ability density of choices in the static approach are unlikely to hold. Hence,
an explicit modelling of the dynamic adjustment process is needed. In do-
ing so it may be useful to restrict attention to LI processes, or even to its
ﬁnite-dimensional subclasses (for example, PD or PDS). However, doing so
15does not guarantee good properties for the steady state distribution. The
next Section provides a proof of these Theorems, which proceeds through a
sequence of lemmata that are of an independent interest.
5 PROOF OF THE MAIN RESULTS
In this Section I develop a sequence of lemmata that eventually lead to
the proof of Theorems of the previous Section. I start with a characterization
of the steady state distributions for the PM processes. Below I assume that
the assumptions of Theorem 1 always hold without stating them explicitly.
Lemma 2 AM a r k o vp r o c e s si sp a y o ﬀ monotone if and only if for any Ω there
exists a strictly increasing continuously diﬀerentiable function gΩ : U(Ω) →
R+/{0} such that
fs,Ω(x)=gΩ(U(x)). (10)
Proof. Consider a rational continuous preference relation º deﬁned by
(x º y) ⇔ (U(x) ≥ U(y)). (11)
The payoﬀ monotonicity implies that fs,Ω(·) is a utility function that repre-
16sents preferences relation º, which is also represented by U(·). Hence, there
exists continuous strictly increasing function gΩ : U(Ω) → R such that
fs,Ω(x)=gΩ(U(x)). (12)
According to Lemma 1, fs,Ω(·) is positive on Ω, hence gΩ(·) > 0.
To prove that gΩ(·) is diﬀerentiable let us consider U, U + δU ∈ U(Ω)
and δU 6=0 .T h e n∃x,x + δx ∈ Ω such that
U(x)=U, U(x + δx)=U + δU. (13)
Note that, since set UC is ﬁnite, it is always possible to select x in such a way
that ∇U(x) 6=0 , which in turn allows to select δx such that hδx,∇U(x)i 6=0 .
Continuity of U(·) implies that
(δU → 0) ⇔ (δx → 0).( 1 4 )
Let δx = akδxk, where a is unit vector pointing in the direction δx.T h e n
lim
δU→0






17Equation (15) asserts that the limit on the left hand side exists, hence the
function gΩ(·) is diﬀerentiable. Moreover, the derivative is continuous. Since
t h el e f th a n ds i d eo f( 1 5 )d o e sn o td e p e n do na, so is the right hand side.




Next, I am going to characterize the PM adjustment processes. As we
will see, the payoﬀ monotonicity implies some connection between the deter-
ministic part of the adjustment process, µ, and its stochastic part, Γ.A sa
corollary, I will prove that any payoﬀ monotone adjustment process is locally
improving. The reverse, however, is not true. Moreover, I will describe a
broad class of locally improving processes such that a generic process of this
c l a s si sn o tp a y o ﬀ monotone.
Lemma 3 Consider Markov process (µ,Γ) and assume that for ∀x ∈ Ω
(µ(x)=0 )⇔ (∇U(x)=0 ) . (16)
The process is payoﬀ monotone if and only if there exists a continuous func-
18tion c : U(Ω) → R+/{0} such that
µ = c(U)Γ∇U. (17)
Moreover, if the Hessian of U has full rank c(·) is diﬀerentiable.
Condition (16) states that is there is no deterministic adjustment at the
critical points of the utility function. That is, all such points would be steady
states of the deterministic dynamics.











is a normalized stationary solution of (5)-(6). According to Lemma 1, it is the
unique normalized stationary solution. According to (18), ξ
0(·)=c(·) > 0.
Hence,
(fs,Ω(x1) ≥ fs,Ω(x2)) ⇔ (U(x1) ≥ U(x2)) (20)
19so the adjustment process is payoﬀ monotone.
Now, suppose that the adjustment process is payoﬀ monotone. Then,
according to Lemma 2, there exists a continuously diﬀerentiable strictly in-
creasing function gΩ : R → R+/{0} such that
fs,Ω(x)=gΩ(U(x)).( 2 1 )
Deﬁne vector




Γ∇U(x).( 2 2 )
Then (5)-(6) implies that vector κ satisﬁes
divκ =0 on Ω, (23)
hκ,ni =0 on ∂Ω.( 2 4 )
Moreover, deﬁnition of payoﬀ monotonicity implies that (23)-(24) should hold








20provided that ∇U(x) 6=0 . The right hand side of (24) does not depend on






Since set UC is ﬁnite, for any z ∈ U(Ω) the exists x ∈ Ω such that U(x)=z
and ∇U(x) 6=0 . Hence, c(·) is deﬁned on U(Ω). According to Lemma 2,
c(·) ≥ 0 and according to (16) and (25) c(·) 6=0 . Hence, c(·) > 0. Finally,
putting κ =0in (22) and using the deﬁnition of c(·) we get
µ(x)=c(U(x))Γ∇U(x). (27)
P r o o fo fd i ﬀerentiability of c(·) is similar to the proof of diﬀerentiability of
gΩ(·) in Lemma 2 and is omitted.
Q.E.D.
An easy corollary of Lemma 3 is that any payoﬀ monotone process is
locally improving.
Corollary 1 If Markov process (µ,Γ) is payoﬀ monotone and (16) holds it
is locally improving.
21Proof. According to Lemma 3, we can write
µ(x)=c(U(x))Γ∇U(x). (28)
for some positive real valued function c(·). Therefore,
hµ(x),∇U(x)i = c(U(x))h∇U(x),Γ∇U(x)i ≥ 0.( 2 9 )
Hence, the process is locally improving.
Q. E. D.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1. The reverse to the Corollary 1,
however, is not true. Indeed, consider the following example.
Example 1. Assume that the choices made by the individual follow the
stochastic process:
dx = ∇U(x)dt + ΛdW. (30)
Here U(·) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable function, which is interpreted
as a utility function of the individual, Λ is n × n matrix of full rank and
W =( W1,...,Wn) is a vector of independent standard Wiener processes. Note
22that the probability density of choices generated by process (30) is governed




Note that (16) trivially holds for this process. The ﬁrst term in (30) cor-
responds to the gradient dynamics and says that the individuals adjust their
choices in the direction of the maximal increase of their utility. The sec-
ond term states that this adjustment is subject to a random error or experi-
mentation. These errors are uncorrelated in time, though correlation among
diﬀerent components of x is permitted and is given by the matrix Γ = ΛTΛ.
















23Consider two choice vectors x =( x1,x 2) and y =( y1,y 2).A s s u m eu(x1)=
u(x2)=5 ,u (y1)=4 ,u (y2)=8 , σ2
1 =1 , σ2
2 =1 0 .T h e nu(x) <u (y) but
f(x) >f(y).
Part 1 of Theorem 2 claims that the situation illustrated by Example 1 is
quite generic. To formalize this idea, consider a class PD of locally improving
Markov adjustment processes (µB, Γ). By the deﬁnition of a PD process we
can write
µB = B∇U
for some positive deﬁnite matrix B with constant coeﬃcients. (Matrix B is
called positive deﬁnite if for any z ∈ Rn/{0}h z,Bzi > 0.N o t et h a tm a t r i x
B is not required to be symmetric.) Such an adjustment process can be
considered to be an element of Rn2+n(n+1)/2 (n2 is the number of independent
elements in matrix B, while n(n +1 ) /2 is the number of the independent
elements in the symmetric matrix Γ). Endowing Rn2+n(n+1)/2 with Lebesque
m e a s u r ew ec a nm a k et h ec l a s sPD a measure space.
Our next goal is to prove that for n>1 PM meets PD by a submanifold
of a lower dimension. Which means that a generic PD process is not PM,
where genericity is understood is both topological and measure theoretic
sense. First, we need to prove a technical result. To formulate it, let x0 ∈ Ω
24and
I = {x ∈ Ω : U(x)=U(x0)} (31)
be the indiﬀerence surface passing through x0.
Lemma 4 Let the Hessian of utility be non-degenerate Then there exist n dif-
ferent points x1,..,xn ∈ I such that vectors ∇U(x1),...,∇U(xn) are linearly
independent.
Proof. First observe that if n vectors b1,..,bn (bi ∈ Rn) are linearly inde-
pendent then ∃δ>0 such that for any ε1,...,εn (εi ∈ Rn, kεik <δ )v e c t o r s
bi+εi are also linearly independent (this follows from the fact that the deter-
minant of the matrix formed by n vectors in Rn continuously depends on its
columns). Since the Hessian of U has full rank the indiﬀerence surface is not
a hyperplane, therefore for ∀ε>0 there exist n diﬀerent points x1,..,x n ∈ I
such that vectors (xi−x0) are linearly independent andkxi − x0k <δ .U s i n g
the full rank assumption again one concludes that vectors bi deﬁned by
bi = D
2U(x0) · (xi − x0)+∇U(x0)
25are linearly independent. But
∇U(xi)=bi + o(ε).
Hence, according to the observation made in the start of the proof one can
choose δ small enough to ensure that ∇U(xi) are linearly independent.
Q. E.D.
Now we are ready to prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 5 Assume n>1 and the Hessian of utility has full rank. Then
PD∩ PM can be embedded in PM as a submanifold of a lower dimension.
In particular, this implies that the Lebesque measure of the PM processes in
class PD is zero and that the set of the PM p r o c e s s e si sn o w h e r ed e n s ei n
PD.
Proof. A c c o r d i n gt oL e m m a3 ,f o re a c hp a y o ﬀ monotone process in class
PD we can write
B∇U(x)=c(U(x))Γ∇U(x). (32)
for some positive real valued function c(·).F i xx0 ∈ Ω and let x1,..,x n ∈ I be
such that ∇U(x1),...,∇U(xn) are linearly independent. Such x1,..,x n exist







j = bij − c(U)γij, (34)
where bij and γij a r em a t r i xe l e m e n t so fm a t r i c e sB and Γ respectively. Then





j =0 . (35)
Since ∇U(x1),...,∇U(xn) are linearly independent, the unique solution of
(36) is yi
j =0 . Since this is true for every i,( 3 5 )i m p l i e s
B = c(U)Γ. (36)
Since both B and Γ are constant matrices c(U)=c>0 is also a constant.
This means that the set of payoﬀ monotone processes is given by B = cΓ,
which is a smooth manifold of dimension 1+n(n +1 ) /2 <n 2 + n(n +1 ) /2,
provided n>1. (A point on the manifold can be uniquely determined by
n(n+1)/2 elements of matrix Γ and c). Therefore, this set is nowhere dense
in PD and has Lebesque measure zero.
27Q.E.D.
T h i sc o m p l e t e st h ep r o o fo fp a r t1o fT h e o r e m2 .T h ep r o o fo fp a r t2i s
almost verbatim the same and is omitted. Now let us return to Example 1.
An interesting corollary of Lemma 4 given by the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume the Hessian of the utility has a full rank. Process
(30) is payoﬀ monotone if and only if Γ = σ2I, where I is the identity
matrix.
Proof. According to Lemma 3, process (30) is payoﬀ monotone if and only
if for any x ∈ Ω vector ∇U(x) is an eigenvector of matrix Γ.M o r e o v e r ,
eigenvalue corresponding to this eigenvector depends on x only through the
utility level U(x). Lemma 4 implies that a symmetric matrix Γ has n linear
independent eigenvalues corresponding to the same eigenvalue, hence Γ =











It is, clearly, payoﬀ monotone.
Q.E.D.
Recall that a Markov adjustment process satisﬁes the IIA property if the
28ratio of the probability that the choice is in an ε− ball centered at the point
x1 t ot h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a ti ti si na nε− ball centered at point x2 does not
depend on whether some other choice z is available, up to the order o(ε).
The following result holds.
Lemma 6 A Markov adjustment process satisﬁes IIA if and only if the Jacobi
matrix of the vector ﬁeld Γ−1µ(x),D (Γ−1µ(x)), is symmetric for ∀x ∈ Ω.





Then, in the steady state j(x) should solve the following boundary problem
div(j(x)) = 0 (38)
hj(x),n(x)i =0on x ∈ ∂Ω. (39)






29T h eI I Ap r o p e r t yi m p l i e st h a tac h a n g ei nΩ will result in multiplication of
f, and hence of j,b yac o n s t a n t ,t h a ti sjnew = Cjold. This relation should
hold at each point, which belongs to the intersection of the new and the
old choice sets. Hence jnew should solve the same boundary problem, but
on a diﬀerent domain. The only vector j that would solve (39)-(40) for any
domain is j =0 . Hence IIA, together with the deﬁnition of j,i m p l i e st h a t










The Jacobi matrix of the left hand side of (43) is the Hessian matrix of
lnf(x). Since, according to Lemma 1, f(x) is positive and twice continuously
diﬀerentiable this matrix is symmetric, so the Jacobi matrix of the right hand
side should also be symmetric.
To prove the reverse, assume that the Jacobi matrix of Γ−1µ(x) is symmet-
ric and deﬁne f(x) to be the solution of (43). According to the Frobenuous
theorem, the solution exists and is unique up to a multiplicative constant.
30It is easy to see that f(·) such deﬁned solves (5)-(6). The constant is chosen
from the normalization condition.
Q. E. D.
Lemma 6 shows that IIA requires some connection between the determin-
istic and stochastic part of Markov process to hold. This connection does not
have any ap r i o r ieconomic justiﬁcation and we should not expect it to hold
in general. Moreover, as I will show below, IIA does not hold for a generic
Markov process from some broad class of the payoﬀ monotone processes. To
see this consider a class PDS of Markov adjustment processes, which is ob-
tained from PD assuming that B is symmetric. I can be naturally embedded
in Rn(n+1). Let us endow this set with Lebesque measure. Then the following
result holds.
Lemma 7 Assume n>1 and for any non-degenerate constant matrix C








0 = Cx. (44)
Then PDS ∩ IIA can be embedded into PDS as a submanifold of lower dimen-
31sion. In particular, this implies that the Lebesque measure of the IIA processes
in class PD is zero and that the set of the IIA processes is nowhere dense in
PD.
Proof. Since both matrices Γ−1 and B are positive deﬁnite, there exists a
non-degenerate constant matrix C such that both CTΓ−1C and CTBC are
diagonal, with all diagonal entries strictly positive (Gantmakher, 1989). Let
us denote the ith diagonal element of Γ−1 as 1/σ2
i and the ith diagonal element
of B as bi.L e tx0 = Cx. Then, according to Lemma 5, the process satisﬁes
























This means that the the set of processes for which IIA holds is a smooth
manifold with dimension at least by one smaller then n(n+1)and therefore,
the set of such processes has Lebesque measure zero and is nowhere dense in
PDS.
Q.E.D.
32This completes the proof one part 5 of Theorem 2. As one can see from
the proof, assumptions (44)-(45) can be weakened. Indeed, it is suﬃcient to
require them to hold only for C that brings Γ−1 and B to a diagonal form,
rather than for any non-degenerate C. Economically, assumption (44) says
that the utility is not additively separable in the components of vector x0.I f
it is separable IIA will hold for any process in PDS.
Results obtained so far show that both the payoﬀ monotonicity and IIA
do not hold for a generic locally improving processes. However, the payoﬀ
monotonicity is strictly stronger assumption then IIA. Indeed, the following
result holds.
Lemma 8 Assume the Hessian of the utility function is non-degenerate.
Then PM ⊂ IIA.
Proof. A c c o r d i n gt oL e m m a3p a y o ﬀ monotonicity implies that
µ(x)=c(U(x))Γ∇U(x) (47)
for some diﬀerentiable function c : R → R+. But then the matrix element













Hence, the matrix is symmetric and the process satisﬁes IIA.
Q.E.D.
This completes the proof of part 3 of Theorem 2. The following lemma
completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 9 Assume that n>1 and Hessian of the utility has a full rank.
Then PDS ∩ PM can be embedded in PDS ∩ IIA as a submanifold of a lower
dimension.
Proof. Following the same logic as in the proof of Lemma 5, it is easy to see
the set PM∩PDShas dimension 1+n(n+1)/2. On the other hand, as one
can deduce from the proof of Lemma 6, set IIA∩PDShas dimension at least
n(n+1)−(n−1) = n2+1. Lemma 8 implies that PM∩PDS⊂ IIA∩PDS.
Therefore, PM∩PDS can be embedded into IIA∩PDS as a submanifold
of a lower dimension.
Q. E. D.
To conclude, I have shown that for a suﬃciently broad class of LI processes
34a generic process does not satisfy IIA and a generic process that satisﬁes IIA
is not PM. Note also that an IIA process need not be LI.
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Two kinds of theories of boundedly rational behavior are possible. Sta-
tic theories focus on stationary behavior and do not include any explicit
mechanism for temporal change. As in rational choice theory, they embody
something of a subject’s cognitive analysis of the choice problem. Dynamic
theories, on the other hand, explicitly model the ﬁne-grain adjustments made
by the subjects in response to their recent experiences.
Both types of theories originated in mathematical psychology. Static the-
ories, ﬁrst considered by Luce (1959), were based on the axiomatic approach
to the characterization of the choice probabilities. Dynamic learning models
where pioneered by Bush and Mosteller (1955). In these models learning is
modelled as a Markov process on the choice set.
The main contribution of this paper is to argue that the axioms of the
static approach are not supported by a generic dynamic adjustment proce-
dure. Therefore, when studying boundedly rational behavior, it would be
35desirable to start with explicit formulation of the learning process.
In the Introduction I mentioned some applied papers that used the static
approach. It would be interesting to study to what extend the results of
these papers are robust to explicit dynamic modelling.
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